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BEN JUDAH:  FRAGILE EMPIRE 
STUDY GUIDE, 2014 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE WEAKEST STRONGMAN 
 
Outline 
 
A. THE STATE, LIKE A FISH, ROTS FROM THE HEAD  (1-2) 
 1. Mayhem in Kushchevskaya 
 2. Sergey Tsapok and His Gang 
 3. Rotting State 
  a. The state’s abject failure as a protection racket against organized crime 
 4. Putin’s Admitted Failure 
  a. Valery Zorkin horrified 
B. PURPOSE OF THE BOOK  (2-4) 
 1. Putin’s Triumph as a Politician and Failure to Build a Modern State 
  a. Dictatorship of law and vertical of power 
  b. Botched state-building: a story of decay 
 2. A Country of Gigantic Contradictions 
  a. Wealthier but more feudalized 
   1) Moscow has more billionaires than New York 
   2) Economy grew faster than Brazil’s 
   3) High corruption, weak property rights, uncompetitive 
 3. Anguished, Broken Society that Putin Is Not Shaping 
a. Crystallizing into a twisted civil society that venerates vigilantes and demonizes 
corrupt officials 
b. Culture war 
 4. Putin’s Squandered Political Capital  
 5. Peak of Putinism 
  a. Celebration of the victory in South Ossetia 
  b. 2011 protest rallies 
 6. Putin Is Squandering His Popularity 
  a. Managed democracy and censorship 
 7. Putinism by Consent Is Coming to an End 
  a. Discontent Is Enormous but Resistance is Marginal 
  b. Collapse of Regime Legitimacy  
   1) Feeling that there is no alternative to Putin 
 8. Author’s Travels 
 9. Apocalyptic Fear 
  a. Volatility and threat of disintegration 
 10. Need to Know Why Russia Fell in Love with Putin  
 
Review 
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CHAPTER ONE:  THE PRESIDENT FROM NOWHERE 
 
Outline 
 
A.  VERA GUREVICH  (7-8) 
 1. Television Tsar 
  a. Largely unknown and alone 
 2. St. Petersburg 
 3. Putin’s Teacher 
B. LITTLE PUTIN  (8-12) 
 1. Form Teacher 
  a. Putka singled out for special attention 
 2. He Fought Like a Cat 
 3. His Weak Mother 
  a. Patriarchy  
 4. Leningrad 
  a. Putin: grandson of a chef and spy 
 5. Komunalka Apartments 
 6. Vladmir Spiridonovich Putin 
 7. No One Ever Beat Him 
 8.  Early Wish to Join the KGB 
 9. Martial Arts 
 10. Study of German 
 11. Leningrad State University 
 12. The Received Notion of a Successful Soviet Union 
  a. Optimism even during the collapse 
 13. Trauma Suffered by the Middle Class 
  a. Dystopian imagination of J.G. Ballard 
C. THE DOUBLE DISASTER  (12-15) 
 1. Putin Interview, 1996 
 2. St. Petersburg 
  a. Faith healers 
 3. Terrifying Statistical Slump 
  a. Deeper than 1930s depression American 
  b. The wild nineties 
  c. Naval town in mothballs 
 4. This Period Defined the Putinist Elite 
  a. His undistinguished career in foreign intelligence 
 5. Life of a Second-Rate Spy 
  a. Little success in his first 35 years 
  b. Anti-communist mob in Dresden, 1989 
  c. Paralysis of power 
  d. Shock of being orphaned 
  e. The defining scar 
  f. Collapse turned him into a failure 
 6. Putin Is from a Lost Generation  
  a. Lost privileges, lost sense of self 
 7. Exposure of Successful Indoctrination Led to Cynicism 
  a. Sense of betrayal 
  b. Andrei Sinyavsky 
   1) Lost generation’s utter disorientation  
   2) Lost meaning in the lives of several generations 
   3) Criminal lawlessness [cf. Edward Banfield on the lower class personality] 
 8. St. Petersburg’s Descent into Anarchy 
  a. Emergence of local oligarchs 
  b. Mafia groups 
  c. High-profile murders 
 9. A Decade of Dizzying Overload 
  a. 1930s heavy-industry fantasy with a police state 
  b. Sudden transition through all the spasms of post-modernity 
  c. Generation emptiness 
  d. Lost ability to see right from wrong 
D. SERVANT PUTIN  (15-23) 
 1. Arkady Kramarev 
   1) Crime wave was like a hurricane 
   2) Simple euphoria at the time of collapse 
 2. Killings Soared, Experienced Officers Left 
  a. No functioning courts 
  b. Kalashnikov justice 
 3. Anatoly Sobchak 
  a. Comparison with Boris Yeltsin 
  b. Strong authoritarian tendencies 
 4. Economy Suffered the Worst Peacetime Setback in History 
 5. Liberal Intelligentsia Called on Yeltsin to Rule by Decree 
  a. Evocation of Peter Stolypin 
  b. Parliament wanted to stop radical reform after the disaster of price liberalization 
   1) Referendum turning St. Petersburg into a republic 
 6. Attack on the White House 
  a. Dimitry Furman’s analysis: new authoritarianism 
  b. Local power brokers improvised their own transitions  
   1) Nizhny Novgorod 
   2) Bashkortostan 
   3) Yakutia 
 7. Yeltsin Brought in the Military and the FSB 
  a. Sobchak did likewise 
  b. Putin had been Sobchak’s student 
  c. Putin as deputy mayor 
 8. Kramarev’s assessment of Putin 
  a. Sobchak thought he would be good for ratings 
  b. Putin knew what he was doing 
 9. Putin Remembered as a Quiet and Efficient Man 
  a. His effectiveness as an intermediary 
 10. Igor Kucherenko 
  a. Anti-Soviet liberal 
  b. Ties with Yegor Gaidar 
  c. Collapse of the KGB 
   1) Putin as a reformer who switched 
  d. His connection with Yeltsin 
 11. Yury Vdovin 
  a. Putin’s boast 
 12. Kamarev on the KGB 
  a. Putin may have been Sobchak’s handler but he was also loyal 
 13. Corruption of Sobchak’s Regime 
 14. Vantanyar Yaiga 
  a. Loyalty of Sobchak and Putin 
  b. His job as foreign affairs advisor 
  c. Putin’s wicked sense of humor 
 15. Andrei Sinyavsky’s Fear 
  a. Disappointment with democracy 
 16. 1991 Food Scandal 
  a. Alexander Belyaev 
  b. Putin’s strengths  
  c. Privatization as a cover for corruption  
 17. Sochak’s Defeat in 1996 
  a. Alexander Korzhakov 
E. OPERATION SUCCESSOR  (23-27) 
 1. Yeltsin’s Problems 
  a. Chechen War 
   1) Defeat of a Russian army that had trained to defeat NATO 
   2) Fulda Gap: Opening to the heart of Germany 
  b. 1996 election 
 2. Pact with the Oligarchs 
  a. Boris Berezovsky 
   1) His death 
 3. Threat of Gennady Zyuganov 
  a. Davos meeting 
 4. Russians Had Expected the West to Help 
 5. Narrow Focus of the Oligarchs 
 6. Davos Pact 
  a. Kremlin began to build a patronage system 
  b. Loans for shares scheme 
  c. Siberian mega-complexes 
 7, Democratic Procedure Subordinated to Keeping Yeltsin in Power 
  a. Bomb alert 
 8. Electoral Fraud 
 9. New Era of No-Alternative Elections 
 10. Monarchical Presidency 
 11. Russian Liberalism Discredited 
  a. Young reformers 
 12. Economic Deterioration  
  a. Default 
  b. IMF cut-off of credit 
 13. Second Founding of the State 
  a. Grigory Satarov 
   1) Nemtsov abandoned 
   2) Search for a Russian Pinochet 
  b. Scores of banks folded 
   1) 84% inflation 
   2) Disruptions 
 14. Solzhenitsyn Spurns Yeltsin 
 15. Alliance of Governors 
 16. The Family Circle Needed a Protector 
  a. Anatoly Chubais 
  b. Putin learns the Russian Federation is primarily a fiction 
 17. Operation Successor 
 18. Berezovsky already Knew Putin 
  a. Yevgeny Primakov  
 19. Putin’s Purge of the FSB and Discrediting of a State Prosecutor 
 20. Putin’s Dependence on the Family’s Money 
  a. His qualities  
F. DREAMING OF PINOCHET  (28-30) 
 1. Fear of Collapse Part Two 
 2. Alexander Voloshin: Managed Democracy 
  a. Escalating fighting in the Caucasus 
  b. Siberian Yakutia 
  c. Kemerovo 
  d. Regional trade barriers 
  e. Tatarstan 
 3. World’s Fourth Highest Murder Rate 
  a. Soaring death rates and slumping birth rates 
 4. Collapse of the Russian Oil Industry in Western Siberia 
  a. Degradation of the fields 
  b. New oil tycoons 
 5. Surreal Explosion of Consumerism 
 6. Impoverishment 
  a. Collapse of the welfare state 
 7. Russian Culture Was in Free Fall as Commercial TV Was Exploding 
  a. Implosion of book and periodical circulation [consistent with a decline down 
    Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs in the J-curve theory of James C. Davies] 
  b. Solzhenitsyn talk show 
 8. The Film Brother, 1997 
G. THE NERVOUS BREAKDOWN  (30-34) 
 1. Putin’s Appointment 
 2. Chechen Attack into Dagestan 
  a. Threatened Yugoslavization of Russia 
 3. Preparations to Invade Chechnya 
  a. Shamil Basayev 
   1) Conspiracy theory 
  b. Anton Surikov 
 4. Beginning of the Second Chechen War 
 5. Bomb Attacks in Moscow 
 6. Patrols by Vigilante Gangs 
  a. Suspicious FSB “training exercise”  
 7. Atmosphere of Conspiracy and Dread 
  a. Alexander Lebed’s accusation [He was subsequently killed in a helicopter crash] 
 8. Suspicions of the Kremlin 
  a. Widespread belief that it was the family and the FSB 
  b. Broken-down state 
 9. Deaths of Key Investigators 
 10. A New Era Had Begun 
  a. Putin’s role as macho-savior 
 11. Putin’s Election as President 
  a. Fear of terrorism 
 12. Putin: All Things to All People 
  a. Projection of people’s dreams 
 13. Putin as the Culmination of Yeltsin’s Choices and Mistakes 
 14. The Vodka Toast 
 15. Victor Pelevin  
 
Review 
 
middle class   wild nineties   paralysis of power 
lost generation   sense of betrayal  Andrei Sinyavsky 
local oligarchs   spasms of post-modernity generation emptiness 
Arkady Kramerev  crime wave   Anatoly Sobchak 
Boris Yeltsin   Peter Stolypin   Dmitry Furman 
Igor Kucherenko on Putin collapse of KGB   Putin’s loyalty 
disappointment with democracy 1991 food scandal  privatization and corruption 
Chechen War   Boris Berezovsky  Gennady Zyuganov 
Davos Pact   patronage system  Siberian mega-complexes 
Monarchical presidency  liberalism discredited  family circle 
Anatoly Chubais  Yevgeny Primakov  managed democracy 
Russian oil industry  consumerism   welfare state 
Dagestan   Shamil Basayev  Second Chechen War 
Alexander Lebed  deaths of key investigators 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  THE VIDEOCRACY 
 
Outline 
 
A.  BEGINNING OF PUTIN’S RULE  (35-39) 
 1. Putinist Manifesto 
  a. Threat of sliding to a lower echelon of states 
 2. Putin Inherited Yeltsin’s People, Agenda, and War 
  a. Beginning of an economic boom 
   1) Rebound from rock bottom 
 3. Mikhail Kasyonov  
  a. Role as a Soviet central planner  
  b. Surprise at the collapse 
  c. He swapped one orthodoxy for another 
  d. Rapid rise under Yeltsin 
  e. Deputy finance minister 
   1) Default  
  f. Finance minister 
 4. Kasyanov as Prime Minister  
  a. Soothing choice for foreign creditors 
  b. Reputation for corruption 
  c. Deal with Putin 
 5. Putin Concentrated on Chechnya at First 
  a. War presidency  
  b. Siege of Grozny 
  c. Tolerance for “temporary measures”  
  d. First clamps on the media 
 6. Example Made of Andrei Babitsky 
 7.  Direct Rule from Moscow Reestablished in 2000 
B. THE PUTIN CONSENSUS  (39-41) 
 1. Two-Front War for Legitimacy: Chechnya and Reforms 
 2. Putin’s 1999 FSB Toast 
 3. Putin Only Interfered with the Gas Sector 
  a. A new devaluation anticipated 
  b. Ambitious but vague reform agenda 
 4. Putin’s Work Ethic 
 5. Impressive Results 
  a. Flat tax 
  b. Land Privatization Bill  
  c. Stabilization Fund 
  d. Relocation of the VAT 
 6. Confidence of the Establishment 
  a. Balanced budgets 
  b. High GDP growth 
 7. Financing of Regular Services 
 8. Muzzling of TV   
C. ROBBERY AND VIDEOCRACY  (41-47) 
 1. TV Had Undone Putin’s Predecessors  
  a. Putin began to build a videocracy  
 2. Media Oligarchs 
  a. Vladimir Gusinsky 
   1) Meeting with Putin 
   2) Kremlin had subsidized the media empires 
   3) Gazprom shares in Media-Most 
  b. Earlier careers of Berezovsky and Gusinsky  
 3. Putin’s Attack on the Oligarchs as a Class 
  a. Putin offers a compromise 
  b. Examples made of Berezovsky and Gusinsky  
   1) Demand that a loan to Gusinsky be paid back 
  b. Berezovsky returns to his old tricks 
 4. The End of Berezovsky  
  a. Putin’s Kursk gaffe 
  b. ORT’s negative coverage 
  c. Media disaster for Putin 
  d. Putin’s threat 
 5. Both Oligarchs Forced into Exile  
 6. End of the NTV Affair 
  a. Gazprom takeover of Media-Most 
 7. Weakness of Society, Journalism, and the Oligarchs 
 8. Berezovsky’s Flight 
  a. Takeover of ORT and NTV 
  b. Putin became Berezovsky 
 9. War on the Oligarchs 
 10. Videocracy 
  a. Silvio Berlusconi 
  b. Tony Blair 
  c. Ability to dominate 24-hour news  
 11. Control of the Airwaves 
D. THE CULT OF PERSONALITY  (47-50) 
 1. Creation of a TV Tsar Through Telepopulism 
  a. Leonid Parfyonov 
   1) How Putin Was Made 
  b. Gleb Pavlovsky 
 2. How Telepopulism Was Deployed  
  a. Boris Johnson 
E. THE PUTIN MAJORITY   (50-54) 
 1. James Bond Dream 
  a. Telepopulism used to turn Russia into the Putin majority 
 2. Pavlovsky Turns Informer 
  a. He sees Putin as the president of the wounded 
   1) Victorious majority of the 2000s was built on vengeful losers 
   2) Stitch-up stability 
  b. Managed democracy 
   1) Sergey Markov 
 3. Putin Coached to Sound Like His Voters 
  a. Formless lower middle class [cf. Edward Banfield] 
   1) His use of fenya 
 4. Solzhenitsyn’s Warning about Gulag Slang 
  a. Putin’s coarse bar humor 
 5. Being a Real Man of the People Is Essential but Not Enough 
 6. Putin reversed Yeltsin’s Criticism of the Soviet Union 
 7. Stabilization of Government Finances 
  a. Budgetniki 
  b. Protests against withheld salaries and benefits dried up 
 8. Generous Putin 
  a. Contrast with Yeltsin’s heartlessness 
 9. Vladislav Surkov and Gleb Pavlovsky Unveil a New Putin 
  a. Creating an embodiment of the state 
  b. 1930s cult of the personality 
  c. Boris Mezhuev’s comment 
 10. Generation P 
  a. Victor Pelevin 
  b. Failure and loss of faith 
  c. Loss of the will to fight 
  d. Babylen Tatarsky 
   1) Cipher for the burned out Moscow media hacks 
 11. Mezhuev’s Assessment 
  a. The 1990s left older men living by Generation P’s morality 
   1) As evil empire exchanged for an evil banana republic  
 
Review 
 
Putinist manifesto  Mikhail Kasyonov  Andrei Babitsky 
impressive results  Vladimir Gusinsky  Kursk gaffe 
Putin became Berezovsky videocracy   telepopulism 
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stitch-up stability  managed democracy  Sergei Markov 
fenya    gulag slang   Vladislav Surkov 
Gleb Pavlovsky   Boris Mezhuev   Generation P 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  THE GREAT TURN 
 
Outline 
 
A.  THE BEAT OF RUSSIAN HISTORY  (55) 
 1. 1929: Stalin Overhauled His Agenda 
 2. Gorbachev’s Glasnost, 1988 
 3. Yeltsin’s Storming of Parliament, 1993 
 4. Putin’s Turn Came in 2003 
B. THE CONSERVATIVE THUG  (55-58) 
 1. Putin’s Family Background 
 2. Harsh, Uncompromising View of the World 
 3. Obsession with History  
  a. Pyotr Stolypin 
   1) Stolypin’s tie 
 4. Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
  a. Biweekly talk show 
  b. His pilgrimage across Russia 
  c. Russian form of liberal authoritarianism 
  d. Highest state honors 
   1) Alexander Gorchakov’s line 
  e. Importance of both human duties and human rights 
  f. How to rebuild Russia 
 5. Putin’s Foreign Policy 
 6. Putin’s Heroes 
  a. Gaullist precedent 
 7. Bridge between Soviet and Free Market Techniques 
  a. Putin’s candidate’s dissertation 
  b. Strategic Planning and Policy plagiarized  
  c. Clearest statement of his economic intentions 
  d. Raw materials focus as a condition for development 
  e. State guidance 
  f. Role of large corporations 
  g. The leader must go on the offensive  
C. THE OPPOSITE MAN  (59-65) 
 1. Clash with Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
 2. Heavy Tax on Crude Oil 
 3. Battle for Control of Russia’s Resources 
 4. Khodorkovsky Was Never a Dissident 
 5. He Had Gambler’s Luck 
 6. Unpopularity of Komsomol  
 7. Collapse of Authority 
a. Khodorkovsky experimented with business at a time when party apparatchiks 
[bureaucrats] sought easy pickings 
8. Soviet Institutions Were Victimized by the Organizational Equivalent of a Colossal Bank 
Run 
9. Privatization of State Assets 
 a. Khodorkovsky given the right to create a bank and create fiat money 
  1) He was the party’s experimentalist 
 b. Defenestration of the last two Komsomol treasurers 
10. Khodorkovsky became Wealthy 
 a. 1993 Manifesto: Man with a Ruble 
11. Liberal and Western-Looking Politics Discredited 
 a. One of the culprits in this historic failure 
 b. The all-powerful Political Technologist 
 c. Khodorkovsky was the first to employ Vladislav Surkov 
  1) Key controller of domestic politics 
12. “Loan, for Share” Insider 
 a. His purchase of the Yuganskneftegaz complex 
13. This Discredited ‘Democrats’ in Russian Eyes 
 a. Khodorkovsky’s later open letter 
  1) Generous promises 
14. Two Years Later Russia Went Bankrupt  
 a. Khodorkovsky on the mistakes of the Yeltsin elite 
  1) Devaluation of Sherbank 
  2) Government bonds could have avoided the default  
 b. Elites moved funds off-shore 
 c. Shareholders left in the lurch 
15. Yukos as a By-Word in Business Circles 
 a. A mafia-style hit 
16. Drive to Change Yukos into a Western Company 
17. Change of Image 
 a. Reputation laundering 
18. Rebranding 
19. Oil Field Transformation  
 a. Production miracle  
 b. Import of Western advisors and techniques 
20. New Fracking, Flooding, and Pump Techniques 
 a. Average flow rate doubled between 1997 and 2002 
21. The Government Could Not Have Done This 
22. Putin’s Telepopulism: All Stunts, No State Building 
 a. Governance crisis 
 b. Shoddy management 
23. Khodorkovsky’s Efficiency Mania 
 a. His inside sources 
 b. Zhukovka  
D. WHO IS SOVEREIGN OVER OIL?  (65-67) 
 1. Khodorkovsky: Richest Man under 40 
  a. Desire for power 
 2. Winning the Battle for Influence in the Duma 
  a. Putin’s lack of control 
 3. Khodorkovsky’s Patronage System 
  a. Bankrolling the opposition:  Grigory Yavlinsky and Boris Nemtsov 
 4. Oil legislation 
 5. Defeat of Attempts to Raise Taxes in the Oil Sector 
 6. Tax Avoidance  
 7. Putin’s Early Warning 
 8. Khodorkovsky’s Lack of Caution  
E. I AM POWERFUL ENOUGH TO INSULT YOU  (67-70) 
 1. Fear of a Weak State 
 2. Open Russia Foundation 
  a. Network of think-tanks 
  b. Charity schools 
 3. Flouting of the Supreme Interests of the Kremlin 
 4. Oligarchs as a Class Had Not Been Liquidated 
  a. Khodorkovsky wanted to be the new Berezovsky 
 5. Putin Was Considered Weak 
 6. Stanislav Belkovsky’s Pamphlet 
  a. Prospect of an oligarchical coup 
  b. Charles Krause: Khodorkovsky never intended to run for president 
 7. Authorities Felt under Attack 
  a. Discussion of the challenge of mounting corruption 
  b. Khodorkovsky’s slide show 
 8. Accusation of corruption against Rosneft 
 9. Putin’s Rejoinder  
F. CAPTURING GENERAL YUKOS  (70-76) 
 1. Khordorkovsky’s Brazenness 
 2. Possibility of Selling a Majority Stake in Yukos to ExxonMobil 
  a. Original understanding of loans for shares 
   1) Creation of a domestic capitalist class 
  b. Putin’s reaction 
 3. Arrest of Yukos Executives 
  a. Warnings by two oligarchs 
 4. Mikhail Kasyanov Sensed the Change 
 5. Unreliability of Alexander Voloshin 
  a. The slides episode 
 6. Khodorkovsky’s Personal Character  
 7. Visit to His Son at Babson College 
 8. Question of Why He Did Not Flee 
  a. Messianic complex? 
  b. Krause thought he misjudged  
 9. A Story about Russian Power 
  a. Strained relations with the West 
 10. Author’s Contact with Khodorkovsky 
 11. Boris Nemtsov 
 12. Arrest Aboard His Jet 
 13. No Role of Law in Such Political Cases 
 14. Show Trial 
 15. This Was Terrifying Political Theater for the Other Tycoons 
 16. Kasyonov’s Demand for an Explanation 
 17. Role of Igor Sechin 
G. THE CONSEQUENCES OF KHODORKOVSKY  (76-80) 
 1. Putin Consensus Imposed on the Oligarchs 
  a. The defining act 
  b. Kasyanov’s opposition 
 2. The Nationalizations Began  
  a. Asset grabs 
3. Putin Allies Started to “Double-Hat” on the Boards of Big Companies [Interlocking 
Directorates] 
 a. All talk of privatizing Rosneft vanished 
4. Oil Boom Fueled the State 
 a. End of lobbying 
  b. 90% of companies’ profits taken in taxes 
 5. Oil Rents and a Huge Share of Assets Seized 
 6. Losers and Winners 
  a. Free-market types and Yeltsin-era officials 
  b. Siloviks and the St. Petersburg team 
  c. Embezzlement 
 7. Warning for Foreign Investors 
 8. Sacking of Kasyanov 
 9. Putin Appointments 
 10. Crushing of Khodorkovsky Caused This Seismic Shift 
  a. Khodorkovsky misjudged his enemy and misunderstood the battle 
b. It resulted in the elimination of the main alternative source of patronage for 
politicians 
 11. Khodorkovsky Still Seen as Putin’s Enemy 
 12. The Irony of the Injustice 
 13. Khodorkovsky’s Penal Situation 
 14. Consequences of Khodorkovsky’s Actions in Russia 
  a. Loss of the main funder for the opposition 
 15. Khodorkovsky’s Assessment of Russia 
  a. Serfdom to various kinds of bosses 
  b. His personal responsibility for what is happening 
 H. AUTHORITARIANISM IS WEAKNESS  (80-84) 
 1. Crisis Management Mode 
 2. Crisis Makes the Personality of a Leader Central 
 3. Entrenched Authoritarianism Came about through Cumulative Reactions 
  a. Kasyanov: Elimination of risks to Putin’s power 
1) Putin’s fear of being exposed 
  b. Why did Putin fear open competition? 
 4. Khodorkovsky’s Exposure of the Governing Crisis 
  a. Not let up in corruption, terrorisms, and lawlessness 
 5. Rising Numbers of Victims 
 6. Every Attack Uncovered Corruption and Collusion 
  a. 2002 Dubrovka Theater siege  
 7. Two Passenger Jets in 2004 
 8. Beslan 
  a. North Ossetia 
  b. The cemetery 
  c. Chechen and Ingush militia stormed the school 
  d. Child massacre 
  e. Dark and anti-Western rhetoric 
 9. Anti-Constitutional Reforms 
  a. Abolition of regional governors’ elections 
  b. Tightened rules for registering parties 
  c. Threshold for parliamentary seating 
 10. The So-Called Dictatorship of Law 
  a. Price tag on every major position 
  b. High murder rate on the streets  
 11. Chronic Incapacity to Deal with Corruption  
  a. The real threat posed by Khodorkovsky 
I. THE COLLAPSE OF MANAGED DEMOCRACY NEXT DOOR  (84-86) 
 1. Ukraine 
  a. Intermarriage of Russians and Ukrainians 
  b. Baptism of the Rus 
 2. Mental Map of the Borders Is Blurred 
 3. Kremlin Electioneering in Ukraine 
  a. Viktor Yanukovych 
  b. Poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko 
  c. Massive fraud 
  d. Paralysis of Kiev by protests 
 4. Bush Administration’s Freedom Agenda 
 5. Horror Gripped the Kremlin 
a. Earlier expectation that an expensive empire was being converted into a cost-
effective sphere of influence 
 6. Dmitry Medvedev’s Role as Chief of Staff 
  a. Gleb Pavlovsky was forced to flee Kiev 
  b. Orange Revolution 
J. WALKING TOGETHER  (86-88) 
 1. Campaigns against the Enemy within 
  a. Rebuilding of Komsomol 
 2. Rent-a-mob 
  a. Walking together 
  b. Vasily Yakemenko 
 3. Campaign against Writers 
  a. Vladimir Sorokin targeted 
  b.  Book toilet 
  c. The group sunk into disrepute 
 4. Nashi 
 5. Strikes and Other Unrest 
  a. Federal Law 122 
 6. Pace of Economic Reform Slowed 
 7. Victory Day, 2005 
  a. $17 million budget 
  b. Battle-wing to smash the Orange threat 
K. THE FEAR OF EMPTY SPACE  (88-89) 
 1.  Kasyanov’s Bitterness 
 2. Meeting with Yeltsin 
 3. Consensus 
 4. Putinism Is Apocalyptic 
  a. Fear that Russia could cease to exist 
  b. U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 
  c. Urgency of the belief 
 
Review 
 
Gorbachev’s glasnost  Pyotr Stolypin   Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
Mikhail Khodorovsky  Komsomol   apparatchiks 
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Boris Nemtsov   Open Russia Foundation oligarchs as an unliquidated class 
ExxonMobil   Mikhail Kasyanov  Alexander Voloshin 
siloviks    elimination of risks to Putin’s power Dubrovka Theater siege 
Beslan    Viktor Yanukovich  Viktor Yushchenko 
Nashi    apocalyptic Putinism 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  THE VERTICAL OF POWER 
 
Outline 
 
A. THE GREY CARDINAL  (90-92) 
 1. View from His Kremlin Office 
  a. Cathedral of the Dormition 
  b. Palace of the Soviets 
 2. Vladislav Surkov 
  Cardinal Mazarin, who tutored Louis XIV, was known as the eminence grise: The Gray 
   Eminence] 
  a. Speed-dial buttons 
 3. Office to Deal with the Tamed Opposition 
  a. Framed portraits 
  b. Surkov’s exploits 
  c. His name is synonymous with amorality and lies 
  d. Alleged play under a pseudonym  
 4. Story of How the System Was Built and How Russia Is Ruled 
  a. Raucous TV and a raucous Duma had weakened Yeltsin’s Kremlin 
  b. Surkov created his clients by corrupting them 
 5. Orchestration of the Most Important No-Alternative Elections 
 6. Putin’s Clowns 
  a. Vladimir Zhirinovsky: Anti-Semitic nationalist 
  b. Gennady Zyuganov: perennial leader of the Russian Communist Party 
B. SEND IN THE BEARS  (92-97) 
 1. Boris Berezovsky 
  a. Operation Successor, 1999 
  b.  New party 
  c. Bear symbol 
 2. Vladislav Surkov 
  a. Big in Moscow PR 
  b. Brought into the family by Voloshin 
  c. He was used to half-truths 
  d. Birth name: Aslambek Dudayev 
   1) Chechen heritage 
 3. His Background 
  a. Possibly in military intelligence 
  b. Khodorkovsky’s business team 
  c. Alfa Group 
  d. United Russia 
 4. What the Yukos and Orange Threats Taught the Kremlin  
  a. Election of Surkov to presidential aide 
 5. Take-off of Surkov’s Career 
 6. Project Grew to Gigantic Proportions 
  a. Bear bureaus 
 7. Branding 
  a. Coopting popular organizations 
   1) Trade and workers’ unions 
  b. Popular causes, including charities 
 8. Party Construction Effort Sucked the Elites into Its Orbit 
  a. Youth groups 
  b. Duma members 
 9. Emergence as the Ruling Party 
  a. Edro 
  b. Putin’s Plan 
   1) Boris Gryzlov 
  c. Sergei Markov 
 10. Party Is Merely a Tool 
  a. A recipe for corruption 
 11. Olga Krystanovskaya 
 12. Managed Democracy Rendered the Duma Lifeless 
  a. Medvedev scolds the Duma in 2010 
  b. Duma died as a meaningful institution  
C. BOTCHING THE VERTICAL  (97-100) 
 1. Vertical of Power 
  a. Bureaucracy answerable to Putin 
  b. Surkov’s view 
 2. Putin Had Been Horrified by the Near Fiction of a Russian Federation 
  a. He had been in charge of regional affairs  
  b. Putin systematically dismantled Russian federalism  
  c. Getting control over the governors again 
   1) Division of country into fiefdoms 
  d. Recentralization 
 3. Presidential Envoys 
  a. Purpose: to get enforcement of laws in the regions 
 4. Breakdown in the supremacy of central law 
  a. Grigory Rapota 
 5. Article 48 of the Constitution Canceled 
  a. New tax code and new VAT law centralized tax payments 
 6. Governors Barred from Serving as Senators 
  a. Putin appointed governors in 2004 
  b. Federation Council became a rubber stamp 
  c. Party lists system 
  d. Local concerns ignored 
 7. United Russia’s Role in Building the Vertical of Power 
  a. A tool for renationalizing politicians  
  b. Directives from the top 
 8. Governors Treated like Apparatchiks  
  a. Creation of a clunky imperial bureaucracy 
 9. It Was a Device That Would Sap away Putin’s Popularity  
  a. Putin made himself responsible for everything 
D. BUILDING UP THE BUREAUCRATS  (100-101) 
 1. Massive Recruitment  
  a. Siloviks 
  b. Spending on them rose from $2.8 to $36.5 billion  
 2. FSB 
  a. Cuts were stopped 
  b. Over 3 million employees of the silovik agencies 
 3. Low-Key Return to Soviet Methods 
 4. Surveillance of the Populace 
  a. Fingerprint dossiers 
  b. Regular murders of journalists 
   1) Culture of intimidation and self-censorship 
 5. Underperformance of the bureaucrats  
E. SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY  (101-103) 
 1. Sergey Ivanov  
  a. New slogan: sovereign democracy, strong economy, and military might 
 2. New Thinking 
  a. The View From Utopia 
3. Imperial Project 
 a. Personification of political institutions 
 b. Ideology was insubstantial  
4. Surkov Concluded the System Is Unstable 
 a. It rests on the resources of one person and one party 
F. THE FLAW IN THE DICTATORSHIP OF LAW  (103-106) 
 1. A successful first term 
  a. Accomplishments 
 2. Circumstances were favorable for state-building 
  a. Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew  
 3. State-building Programs Flawed  
  a. Court politics  
 4. A Fiscal Sinkhole 
 5. Democracy as the Dictatorship of Law 
  a. Aim: To end the bureaucratic break-down 
 6. Gelding of All Competing Institutions to Putin 
  a. Independent power centers neutered 
   1) Checks and balances are important for exposing incompetence 
 7. Personalization of Power 
  a. Primary evidence of state inefficiency is corruption 
 8. Petty Corruption Is the Result of Putin’s Flawed Agenda 
 9. The Fatal Flaw 
  a. Putin bought the loyalty of elites 
  b. He also expanded the bureaucracy (the new class) 
c. He elevated them while closing down all institutions that could hold them to 
account  
 10. Consequence: This Gave Officials Impunity to Behave in a Predatory Manner 
 11. Vladimir Burmatov 
 12. The Rule of 30 Percent 
  a. Volume of bribes increased to $316 billion in 2005 
  b. Corruption Perceptions Index 
 13. Businessmen Can Rent Courts to Persecute their Enemies 
  a. Prosecutions for economic crimes 
   1) 30% of adult males have a criminal record  
 14. Nobody Guards the Guardians 
  a. Europol estimates 
  b. Dictatorship of a venal officialdom 
G. SOLDIERS OF SURKOV  (106-110) 
 1. Zakhar Prilepin 
  a. San’kia 
  b. Soldier in the Chechen wars 
  c. Sacha, a cipher for a fatherless generation  
 2. Surkov’s Effort to Avoid a Repeat of the Orange Scenario 
  a. Purpose of Nashi 
 3. Generation Elusive 
  a. A brutalized generation 
  b. Cynical moral wasteland of the 1990s 
  c. Hooliganish behavior  
 4. A Rainbow Spectrum of Cultish Gangs 
  a. The Soviet structures bred loyalty despite oppression 
   1) They were real social lifts 
  b. Now the power elite is evolving into a removed aristocracy 
 5. Surkov and Pavlovsky’s Plans for Nashi 
 6. MGIMO University 
a. Students were children of a cross section of a coarse ruling class that had 
replaced the Soviet nomenklatura [holders of key administrative positions] 
b. The idea of joining Nashi repulsed them 
7. Most People Lived in a State Where all the Social Elevators of the USSR Had Rotted or 
Snapped 
 a. Access to opportunity is extremely limited 
 b. Cult of the gangster 
8. Nashi was a godsend for such people 
 a. Promise of Upward Mobility 
9. Camp Seliger 
 a. Guest lectures 
 b. Kind of girls who turned up 
  1) Sveta Kuritsina from Ivanovo 
 c. Mockery by the middle class 
10. Anti-fascist Slogans 
 a. Use of the collective memory to inject hysteria and paranoia 
11. Attacks on ambassadors 
 a. Tony Brenton 
H. RUBBING SALT INTO RUSSIAN WOUNDS  (110-111) 
 1. Whole Campaign Was Designed to Make Russians Feel Paranoid and Humiliated 
 2. Whipping up Residual Neuroticism 
  a. Alexander Dugin [geopolitical theorist and leader of the Eurasian movement] 
  b. “Documentaries” about attacks on ethnic Russians 
  c. Bush administration as a cast of villains 
 3. West Vilified by Putin 
  a. Fall of the USSR lamented  
  b. Rehabilitation of Stalin  
I. EVERYDAY PUTINISM  (111-114) 
 1. Shock of the Soviet Implosion Was Fading away 
  a. What lingered 
 2. Intimidation 
  a. Fringe comments became mainstream once Putin said them 
 3. Normal People First Feel the Politics of Fear in Schools 
  a. Post-Gorbachev remilitarization  
  b. Return to the old mandatory Soviet military day 
  c. Textbook changes 
 4. Conscription into the Army after Graduation 
  a. Avoidance 
  b. A year spent being brutalized into men 
 5. Dedovschina (Grandpa’s Terror) 
  a. Rapes and murders 
 6. The Lucky Ones go to University 
  a. Technical institutes tend to crack the whip 
  b. Elite establishments 
  c. Out in the provinces 
 7. The Invisible Line 
  a. The risks of protesting  
  b. Choice of work 
   1) Journalism seen as a PR hackery 
   2) Bureaucracy became more popular as a career path  
  c. Conversation on the Trans-Siberian 
 8. Return to Old Soviet Patterns 
  a. Only Khodorkovsky knew where Putin’s invisible line was 
 9. Lost Sense of Freedom without a Feeling of Fear 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  PUTIN’S COURT 
 
Outline 
 
A. ALONE IN THE CASTLE  (115-116) 
1. Putin’s Evolution to Tsar-like Authority  
 a. Three stages 
  1) Putin brought in his clan 
  2) Putin made sure his was the only court 
  3) His friends evolved into tycoons 
   a) Distribution of the right to collect rents from natural resources 
2. Simon Kordonsky 
 a. High-level positions under Putin 
 b. Desire to build a diversified market economy 
 c. Power of the state is based on control of rents and subsidies 
 d. His thesis 
  1) The core of the economy is no longer a market 
  2) Putin’s control of all key resource flows 
3. Russia’s Post-communist Feudal Future 
B. THE EMBEZZLER’S PALACE  (116-121) 
 1. Sergei Kolesnikov 
  a. Exile in Tallinn 
  b. Business selling medical equipment 
   1) Post-Soviet hustling 
  c. A chunk of the nomenklatura became the capitalist elite 
 2. Kolesnikov Meets Putin, 1991 
 3. Kolesnikov Approached by Nikolai Shamalov  
  a. Creation of an offshore account 
   1) Roman Abramovich 
  b. Creation of Rosinvest 
  c. Putin’s friends organized themselves as a business 
  d. Words used to address Putin 
  e. Small house on the Black Sea 
   1) Small by comparison with those of the elites along Rublevka highway 
 4. Soviet Dachas 
  a. Stalin’s Lake Ritsa summerhouse 
  b. Gorbachev’s gaudy residence 
 5. Putin’s Palace 
  a. Modeled like Peterhof 
  b. Nicer than Sochi 
  c. Project South  
  d. Putin’s court created a tsar  
 6. Kolesnikov Tries to Quit 
  a. He is told he is a serf 
  b. Putin is a dictator, not a tsar 
  c. He fled to Turkey then the US 
  d. Shamalov’s denials  
 7. Putin Cannot Change 
C. THE MEANING OF FRIENDS  (121-122) 
 1. Putin’s Loyalty 
  a. Natural leader 
 2. St. Petersburg Friends 
  a. Boris and Arkady Rottenberg 
  b. Gennady Timchenko 
   1) His Gunvor is based in Switzerland 
 3. Ozero Dacha Cooperative 
  a. Vladimir Yakunin 
  b. Yuri Kovalchuk 
  c. Vladimir Smirnov 
  d. Sergey Fursensko  
  e. Andrei Fursenko 
 4. Total Assets of These Friends 
 5. Preferential Treatment of Putin Assets 
 6. Corruption Is about Power 
D. HIS COURTIERS  (122-25) 
 1. A Society of Palatial Estates 
 2. Composition and Behavior of Putin’s Court 
  a. Liberal modernizers with corrupt embezzlement trails 
 3. Devotion to a New Form of Court Politics 
  a. Court of Elizabeth I 
  b. New court politics with Yeltsin’s destruction of the party 
 4. Neo-Kremlinology 
 5. Comparison with Elizabeth I’s Court 
  a. Catfight in the Politburo that led to Gorbachev’s election was based on principle 
  b. The Elizabethan court was enlivened by jostling between factions and favorites 
  c. Putinist liberals and siloviks fight but stick together 
 6. Mapping the Russian Elite 
 7. Several Major Species of Oligarchs 
 8. Their Distinct Strategies 
  a. Roman Abramovich’s 
  b. ALFA groups 
  c. Putin’s 
 9. Putin Imposed a Consensus on the Oligarchs 
  a. He became arbiter, dealmaker, and fixer 
  b. Stability 
E. THE ROAD TO RUBLEVKA  (125-28) 
 1. Putin Rewarded His Ministers with Board Memberships on State Corporations 
  a. Loyalty ensured through a web of corruption (cf. Louis XIV and Charles II) 
  b. Rublevka love 
 2. Rublevka Has Been Transformed into a Russian Beverly Hills 
  a. Elite schools and dynastic marriages 
 3. Spoiled Children of Privilege 
 4. Rublevka as a Way of Life 
  a. Estimates by watch watchers 
 5. Putin’s Estate 
 6. Moscow has More Billionaires than Any City in the World 
  a. Average membership of the power elite are millionaires 
  b. Putin defends his minority 
  c. A huge free-floating cavernous anxiety lurks beneath all this 
   1) Everything is unsecured 
 7. Case of the Petrol-Princess 
  a. Early penury in Surgut 
  b. Her entourage 
   1) Father says none of this fortune is safe 
  c. Classmates that disappeared from school 
F. SHALLOW CHEKISTS AND FAINT LIBERALS  (128-34) 
 1. A Social World that Pulls in Opposition Leaders 
  a. Arkady Dvorkovich 
  b. Igor Shuvalov 
  c. This liberalism is thin 
 2. Shuvalov as the Court Chamberlain 
  a. Snub to Prince William 
  b. 2010 official income statement 
  c. Alexei Sudrin vs. Dmitry Medvedev 
 3. Putin’s Court Is a Provincial Palace 
  a. Civilians and siloviks are two sides of Sobchak’s local political mafia 
   1) German Gref 
   2) Alexey Kudrin 
 4. Gref’s and Kudrin’s Liberalism Had Limits 
  a. Corruption in the Federal Tax Service 
   1) Criminal raiders 
   2) Death of Sergei Magnitsky 
 5. The St. Petersburg Siloviks 
  a. Igor Sechin 
   1) Current head of Rosneft 
   2) Today his name is something of a myth 
   3) He leads the hard liner faction 
   4) Vladimir Yakunin’s Defense of State Capitalism 
6. Background of the Siloviki 
7. Russia Is Not Run by the Successors of Andropov’s KGB 
 a. Thinness of both sides of their agenda 
8. Viktor Cherkesov’s Critique of Putin’s Men 
 a. Shallow Chekism of the Putin Court 
 b. Whistle-blowers 
 c. Western lifestyles 
9. Case of Yury Luzhkov 
 a. Retirement to London 
 b. Vladislav Inozemtsev: Russia is not a KGB state 
10. Tudor England: Distant vs. Engaged Approach to Courtiers 
 a. Yeltsin’s engagement 
 b. Putin’s Elizabethan distance 
  1) His faction management 
11. Continuity in the Cabinet  
 a. Sergey Ivanov 
12. Dmitry Rogozin 
 a. Minister for the military-industrial complex  
 b. Right-wing nationalism 
 c. Service as ambassador to NATO 
 d. Jester role 
13. Putin Cuts a Lonely Figure 
 a. Invisible spouse, Lyudmila 
 b. Alleged liaisons with a gymnast 
G. DEAD SOULS  (134) 
 1. Putinist Politics Is Dampened by its Avarice 
 2. Lukewarm Regime 
 3. The Stage for Surkov’s Puppet Shows 
  a. Zero-sum mentality of self-made men: They are the geniuses 
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CHAPTER SIX:  DIZZY WITH SUCCESS 
 
Outline 
 
A. PAST AS PROLOGUE  (135-137) 
 1. Vladimir Sorokin’s Day of the Oprichnik 
 2. Russians Shrug off the Creeping Authoritarianism 
  a. Supermarkets 
  b. Macro-economic stabilization  
  c. Globalization 
  d. Emerging middle class 
 3. The Earlier Material Hardship 
  a. Queues at stores 
  b. Missed payrolls 
  c. Bread shortages 
  d. Barter 
 4. Moscow as a Wrecked Satellite of Europe 
  a. Sense of style 
  b. Collapsed old woman in metro tunnels 
  c. Alcoholic bamjee 
 5. Sight of the Elderly Selling Keepsakes 
B. PUTIN’S BOOM  (137-140) 
 1. The Coming Russian Boom, 1996 -- Went Bust 
2. Economic Recovery 
3. Upward Cycle 
 a. Efficiency gains pioneered by Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
4. Consumer Boom Meant a Tax Boom 
5. Alexander Lebedev’s Observation about this Windfall 
6. Value of Other Siberian Treasures Soared as Well 
7.  Boom and the Pay Down of Debts 
8. Consumer Revolution 
 a. Tripling of GDP per capita in nine years 
 b. Private housing 
 c. Mobile phones and PCs 
 d. New car registrations 
 e. Putin’s popularity 
9. Russians Were Well-Positioned to Enjoy a Strong Rise in Consumer Power 
 a. Low debt, home ownership 
 b. Per capita GDP probably underestimated 
10. Boom Returned Russia to a Solvent Actor on the World Stage 
 a. Payoff of IMF debts 
 b. Likewise the Paris club of creditors 
 c. The state was new out of receivership 
 d. Surkov: But it was due to a precarious reliance on commodity prices 
 e. Budget dependence on hydrocarbons, like Saudi Arabia, but unlike the United 
   States 
11. Cycles of Russian History follow Commodity Prices 
 a. Grain prices under the tsars 
 b. Failure of Lenin’s NEP 
 c. Invasion of Afghanistan 
 12. The Regime Grows Hubristic at the Head of the Cycle 
 a. Moscow’s changing skyline 
  1) Western style in the 90s 
  2) Bully towers with gothic turrets in the 00s 
13. Four Megatrends 
 a. Middle class 
 b. Muslim migrants 
 c. Resurgent Orthodox church 
 d. Political class Westernization  
C. THE RISE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS  (141-144) 
 1. Educated and Globalized Consumer Class 
 2. Biggest Myth about Them 
  a. Elitist point of view 
  b. Difficulty of defining this class 
 3. Dimitry Drobnitsky and Boris Mezhuev 
  a. Meeting in Kofe Khaus 
 4. The New Not-Quite-Post-Soviet Everywoman 
  a. Came from the provinces 
  b. Accountant at a small firm 
  c. Single mother 
  d. Self-respect 
  e. VKontakte 
  f. Khimki 
 5. Russians Began to Globalize 
  a. Direct flights abroad 
  b. Magadan 
 6. Tourists from the “Depths” 
 7. Majority Remained Poor and Socially Excluded 
 8. Health Improvements 
  a. Reversal of demographic decline 
 9. Growth of class differences 
 10. Disdain by the Liberal Intelligentsia 
  a. People’s complete rejection of politics 
  b. Life between apathy and IKEA 
D. PUTIN’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY  (144-145) 
 1. Prosperity Strengthened the Putin Consensus and Majority 
  a. Government intervention to create a boom 
   1) Flat tax 
   2) Business registration 
   3) Inspections 
   4) Licenses 
   5) Exemptions 
  b. Stabilization of financial services 
 2. Sergei Aleksashenko 
 3. Only 36% of the Strategy 2010 Reforms Were Achieved 
 4. United Russia Straitjacket 
E. THE RISE OF THE RUNET  (145-147) 
 1. Technologically in Personal Computing Late in the Soviet Period 
 2. By 2010 Russia Was the Largest Internet Market in Europe 
  a. Runet 
 3. Putin Did Not Erect a Great Fire Wall as China Did 
 4. Three Defining Features of the Runet 
  a. The platform that hosts it is largely indigenous 
   1) Yandex 
  b. Incredible success of social media 
   1) VKontakte 
   2) Odnoklassniki 
   3) Livejournal for blogging 
   4) Opposition migrated to blogging 
   5) Nationalist and liberal clusters: no Putin cluster 
  c. It went mainstream in the later 2000s 
   1) Online trap for the Kremlin  
F. THE RISE OF MIGRANT RUSSIA  (147-150) 
 1. Boom Sucked in a Lot of Cheap Labor 
a. Caucasian and Central Asian migrants 
b. Hamid 
 2. Transformation of Major Cities 
  a. Creation of racially distinct underclass 
 3. Asian Migrants 
 4. Visa-Free Regimes 
 5. Ethnic Seismic Shift 
  a. De-Europeanization 
  b. Anatoly Vishnevsky’s estimates 
 6. Appeals to Nationalism while Admitting More Migrants 
  a. Discreet multicultural campaign 
 7. Tough Life for Migrants  
  a. Near slavery 
  b. Racially distinct underclass 
  c. No incentive for innovation 
  d. Result: Migrants were stalling Russia’s modernization 
 8. Cracking the Putin Consensus 
G. THE RISE OF HOLY RUSSIA  (150-) 
 1. Revolutionaries Who Came to Power during the Collapse 
  a. Yeltsin and Gaidar died with regrets 
  b. Patriarch Alexy II triumphed 
 2. Church’s Explosive Growth 
 3. Its Wealth 
  a. Power and prestige 
 4. Church’s Support of Yeltsin 
 5. Russian Army Infiltrated 
 6. Law Curtailing the Invasion of the Sects 
 7. The Trade in Duty-Free Cigarettes 
  a. Bandit economy 
  b. Putin encouraged to invest in the Church as if it were a state corporation 
 8. Church’s Massive Construction Campaign 
  a. Its own mass media 
   1) Orthodox blogs 
 9. Cathedral of Christ the Savior 
  a. Destruction by Stalin in 1931 
  b. Restoration 
  c. Flamboyance of restored power 
  d. New gold-domed provincial churches 
  e. Social institutions rebuilt 
 10. Cultural Rewiring 
 11. Infiltration of the Church into the Political Routine of the Country 
  a. Invented traditions 
 12. The Church’s Rise Both Aided and Subtly Undermined Putin  
  a. Third Rome 
  b. Aspiration to be a second Brussels 
 13. Preparation for a culture war against liberal Russia 
H. KUDRIN SUCCEEDS, SURKOV FAILS 
 1. Putin’s State of the Nation Address, 2007 
  a. His boasts 
 2. Alexey Kudrin 
  a. Macroeconomic stabilization 
  b. Failure to diversify the economy 
 3. Surkov’s Projects Failed to Improve Russia’s Poor-Quality Governance 
  a. New sinecures and extended patronage networks 
 4. The Boom Covered Up Serious Structural Weaknesses 
  a. Favorable polls 
 5. Contradiction between the Economic Success and the Bureaucratic Failure 
  a. Corruption and the monarchical presidency 
  b. Society began evolving on its own 
I. DELIRIOUS MOSCOW  (156-59) 
 1. Fadorin Series 
  a. Boris Akunin 
 2. Rejection of the Tradition of Togetherness [Communalism] 
  a. Escapism of the new consumers [individualism] 
 3. Years of Glamour 
 4. Websites of Small Opposition Factions 
a. Theory of small deeds 
b. Vasily Esmarov 
 5. Three Time-Historical Zones of the 1990s 
 6. Filip Dzyadko 
 7. Cult of Creativity 
  a. Free cafes 
 8. Boom in Foreign Travel 
 9. Network of New Media 
  a. Afisha 
  b. Dozhd 
 10. Leonid Parfyonov 
 11. Agitation of the Keenest Observers of Society 
 12. Burn-out of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin Generation 
 13. Seeds of the New Opposition 
J. DREAMING WITH BRICS  (159-61) 
 1. Expectation That Russia Would Overtake Britain and France in GDP 
 2. Fast Connecting New Global Superclass 
  a. Davos 
 3. Pre-Crash World 
 4. Russian Self-Image as a Rising Power 
 5. Talk of the End of the Unipolar World 
  a. Sergei Lavrov’s Munich speech 
 6. Putin Ceased to Be Treated as a Conventional Politician 
 7. Putin Began to Change 
  a. Hubris 
 8. Power Loves to Build 
  a. Moscow City 
  b. Joke about World War Three 
K. THE SHORT OLD WAR  (161-66) 
 1. Color Revolutions [Orange, Ukraine, 2003; Rose, Georgia, 2005; Tulip, Kyrgyzstan, 
  2006] 
  a. Russia now had the power and resources tpo strike back 
 2. Russian-backed Political Agitation 
 3. Fear of a New Cold War 
  a. Karl Marx: “History repeats itself twice: first as tragedy, then as farce” 
  b. Short Cold War 
 4. Ukraine Is Not Really Abroad for Russians 
 5. Imperative to Stop Ukrainian NATO Membership 
  a. Russian sphere of influence 
 6. Georgia 
  a. Mikhail Saakashvili 
   1) Georgian model 
 7. Georgian Attack on South Ossetia 
 8. Zugzwang [Compulsion to Move]  
[cf. what happened in Kiev in February 2014]  
 9. Collision of Three Hubristic Projects 
  a. Georgian 
  b. American 
  c. Russian 
  d. Threat by Viktor Yushchenko to block Russian fleet 
 10. Peak of Putin’s Popularity 
 11. Destruction of Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian Capital 
  a. Wreckage 
  b. Effective Annexation 
  c. Victory Concert 
   1) Valery Gergiev 
 12. End of Russian Retreat 
 13. But the War Was a Sideshow 
 14. Crimea 
 15. Global Crash 
  a. Putin consensus torn apart 
  b. Weakness of Russian’s claim to be rising with China was exposed 
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CONCLUSION: THE GHOSTS 
 
Outline 
 
A. THE LEGACY OF PUTINISM  (324-30) 
 1. Ghost of Nicholas II [This may have been inspired by Whittaker Chambers’ “The Ghosts 
   on the Roof”] 
 2. Retreat from Moscow 
  a. New administrative quarter 
 3. Fall from Grace 
  a. Thief who has stolen the state 
  b. Aggression of the insecure 
 4. Russia Has Fallen out of Love with Putin 
  a. Managed democracy 
  b. Puppets and clowns 
  c. Videocracy 
  d. Telepopulist superstar 
 5. Putin Achieved a Hegemony That Was the Envy of Authoritarians 
 6. His Regime Built a Dysfunctional and Anachronistic Power Structure 
  a. Gigantic transfer of assets 
  b. Vertical of power 
  c. Dictatorship of law 
 7. The Reality: Seeds of Corrosion Planted into the Putin Model 
  a. Vertical of corruption 
  b. Dictatorship of predatory officials 
  c. Fragmented and feudalized country 
 8. Economic Boom 
  a. New middle class 
 9. Telepopulism 
  a. Putin consensus cemented over the elite and a Putin majority over society 
 10 Putinism Began to Undermine Itself 
  a. Modernization agenda was bound to disappoint 
  b. Financial crisis 
  c. Shift in values 
 11. Putin’s Return 
  a. Result: Disintegration of the Putin consensus 
  b. Change driven by the boom undermined Putin’s telepopulism 
 12. Exposure of the Regime’s Power Base 
  a. United Russia tarred as the party of crooks and thieves 
  b. Protests over rigged elections 
 13. Protest Movement 
  a. Beginning of the end of Putinism by consent 
  b. Culture war and class war 
  c. Hydrocarbons: Mounting production and investment problems 
  d. Spending spree 
 14. Strategy of Divide and Rule 
  a. Anguished country 
  b. People crave a modern state 
  c. precarious status quo 
  d. Officials as werewolves in uniform 
 15. The State Has Shaped Russian Society for Centuries 
  a. Civil society was broken in the 1990s 
  b. Putin has failed to come up with projects or ideologies that could shape society 
   1) Society is now going its own way 
  c. Politicization of the middle class 
  d. Crystallization into a civil society 
 16. Russia Is One of History’s Failures 
  a. What might have been 
 17. Need to Restore Institutions Putin Has Destroyed 
 18. Russia Is Not at Risk of State Collapse 
 19. Putin’s Apocalyptic 
 20. West Needs Contingency Plans 
  a. Question of what happens when his back is against the wall 
 21. Rise of Alexey Navalny as an Opposition Lightning Rod [blocked from becoming 
   Moscow’s mayor by being prosecuted] 
 22. Nightmares 
  a. About Nicholas II in the Kremlin 
  b. About an endless cycle of revolution, stagnation, and collapse amongst the 
   intelligentsia 
 23. The Ghost of Boris Yeltsin 
 24. Fear of Another Great Reversal by a Pretender to the Throne 
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